Impacts of the Indonesian Economic Crisis: Price Changes and the Poor by James Levinsohn et al.
Impacts of the Indonesian Economic Crisis:
Price Changes and the Poor
James Levinsohn
University of Michigan
NationalBureau of Economic Research
Steven Berry
Yale University




In July 1997, following the decline of the Thai Bhat, the Indonesian Rupiah fell dramatically (or so
it seemed at the time.) Since that initial decline of the Rupiah, the Indonesian economy has undergone
tremendous change. The Rupiah has been subject to large swings, prices of some goods have risen
substantially,and billionsof dollars have been loaned by international lendingorganizations. These are not
subtle changes. In this paper, we make a first-pass attempt at providing early estimates of the impact of the
Indonesian economic crisis on Indonesia’s poor.
While some might argue that the very poor are so impoverished that they are essentially insulated from
swings in the international economy, it is more frequently argued that the very poor are among the most
vulnerable to such swings. This is especially probable for the urban poor. Furthermore, in countries with
little or no social insurance, any impacts of price changes on the very poor are unlikely to be muted by
government policiesin the way that they might be in richer countries.
These issues matter. From a broad humanitarian view, the magnitude of the price changes and the size
of the impacted population argue that there is value to simply understanding what has happened. From a
more narrow political view, the political economy of price changes may well depend in crucial ways on
who bears the brunt of price increases. From the viewpoint of organizations such as the IMF which offer
policy advice and (sometimes) loan conditionality,understandinghow that advice might impact the poor is
important. Finally, from a ridiculously narrow academic perspective, there is not an abundance of research
on possiblelinks between the internationaleconomy and the very poor.
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12. Some Background
We begin by setting the stage. The changes the Indonesian economy has undergone are dramatic. The
purpose of this section is to very briefly review some of those changes. As background, Table 1 provides
some information on recent changes in prices and exchange rates. From December 1996 until July 1997,
the Rupiah traded in a narrow range of around 2400 to the U.S. dollar. The consumer price index (CPI)
provided by the Bank of Indonesiashows stableprices for each of four aggregates-- food, housing,clothing,
and health. In July 1997, the Thai Bhat nose-dived and the Rupiah followed suit. In Table 1, this appears
in the August 1997 entry where the Rupiah is reported at 3035 to the dollar. Although this was a sudden
depreciation on the order of 20 percent, prices rose only with a lag. Throughoutthe remainder of 1997, the
Rupiah continued to depreciate against the dollar and (except in November) against the Yen. The food CPI
rose from 105 to 120-- a noticeable increase but not an overwhelming one. The CPI for housing, clothing,
and health care rose yet more modestly. On the economic policy front, the IMF approved a $10 billionloan
while the World Bank pledged $4.5 billionfor a three year program.
It was not until 1998 that matters became considerably more problematic. On January 8, sometimes
referred to as ‘‘Black Thursday,’’ the Rupiah began a free fall and news accounts reported panic-like food
purchasing. Theexchange rate fell atone pointin Januarytoabove 16,000Rupiahper dollarand theCPI for
food jumped almost as much in January as it had the previous six months combined. The CPI for clothing
jumped even more. As international pressure to drop a proposed currency board increased, and aid was
deferred, uncertainty mounted. For the first four months of 1998, prices continued to rise as documented in
the lastfour columns of Table 1. In May 1998, riotsspread and over a thousandpeople were reported killed.
The World Bank postponed two loans totaling over a billion dollars, and the Bank and Fund as well as
many embassies evacuated non-essential staff. On May 21, President Suharto resigned. The Rupiah traded
at around 11,000 immediately after the resignation. The Bank of Indonesia reported the largest monthly
Rupiah to dollar rate in June 1998-- 14,900. Thereafter the Rupiah began a gradual appreciation (albeit
from an astoundinglylow level.) The CPI reported rising prices throughSeptember 1998. The CPI for food
reached 261 (relative to a level of about 100 in January 1997) while the CPIs for housing, clothing, and
health hit 156, 225, and 204 respectively. (Throughout this period the CPI for housing was relatively more
stable-- perhaps reflecting the somewhat non-traded nature of housing.) Although peaceful protests turned
violent in Jakarta in mid-November 1998, order was quickly restored.
It would of course be a tremendous oversimplification to attribute these changes to the international
economy-- or to any other single cause. Price levels and exchange rates are endogenouslydetermined. Our
goal is to analyze the impact of the changes surveyed in Table 1, but we do not attempt to analyze the
root cause(s) of the macroeconomic changes. We realize, for example, that it is (barely) conceivable that
2purely domestic inflation suddenly ran rampant leading to the Rupiah’s depreciation, and in this (unlikely)
scenario, the price changes in Table 1 would have little to do with the international economy. Given most
accounts of the East Asian crisis and the contagious behavior of other East Asian exchange rates and price
levels, it seems plausible that there was indeed an internationalelement to the changes surveyed in Table 1.
Our goals include a more disaggregated analysis of the impacts of the price changes. The aggregated
nature of the figures in Table 1 hide potentially important heterogeneity. The first type of heterogeneity
concerns heterogeneity within commodity groups. For example, ‘‘Food’’ contains hundreds of items and it
is possible that the price behavior of those items consumed by the non-poor is quite different than the price
behaviorof food items consumedprincipallyby the poor. The secondtype of heterogeneityis geographical.
Indonesiais a geographicallydispersedcountrywhere simplearbitrage may be costlydue to transportcosts.
This suggests that there may be significant price variation within a narrowly defined product class across
geographicareas. What happenstoprices in especiallypoor areas may be quitedifferent from what happens
to prices in the wealthier areas. The third type of heterogeneity is across consumers. Our focus is not on the
representative consumer, but rather we care about the consumption patterns of the very poor. Examining
aggregate consumptionpatterns may be quite misleading in this context.
3. Data Concerns and Constraints
There are many ways one could estimate how the large changes in prices in Indonesia over the last one
and a half years have impacted the poor. In the end, the methods used will depend quite crucially on the
available data. With this in mind, we briefly outline the data that are, and are not, available. We begin with
the unattainable ideal. In the best case, one would have detailed consumption data that spanned the period
before and after the financial crises of 1997-98 for thousands (or tens of thousands) of households. The
time series variation would allow the researcher to examine how consumption patterns changed when faced
with the large price changes. The large household survey would give the researcher enough households
so that a focus on the very poor would still allow a sufficient number of observations. It would also be
important to have detailed price data on a disaggregated set of commodities. This data would need to cover
the most recent two years. Even this data, ideal and unattainableas it is, would pose significanteconometric
issues due to the nature of the questions posed. This is because what we want to know is how households
in a particular part of the income distribution behaved in response to price changes and even the most
sophisticated demand systems typically estimate a utility-consistent demand structure for a representative
consumer. While, with infinite data, one could estimate a demand structure for just a particular decile of
the income or wealth distribution, this would be massively inefficient. (A topic of future research is the
estimation of a utilityconsistentdemand system that explicitly accommodates the heterogeneity inherent in
studyinghow the poor respond to price changes.)
3In fact, the data described above simply do not exist.
1 The good news, though, is that reality is
less far-removed from this ideal than is usually the case. Indonesian data sources are in fact quite good.
Indonesia conducts an extensive household consumption survey (SUSENAS) covering on the order of
50,000 households. Most recently, these surveys have been conducted in 1981, 1984, 1987, 1990, and
1993.
2 While the surveys are large, they are not panels. That is, there is no systematic effort to track the
same households over time. These surveys cover a wide geographic range of the country and contain very
detailed consumption data.
3 The data do not contain prices, though. Rather, the data contain unit values
which are defined as expenditure divided by quantity. These unit values may differ across households that
in fact face identical prices due to differences in the quality of the households’ consumption. (i.e. While
all households in a village may face the same prices for high quality and low quality rice, the unit values
recorded fora householdthatboughtmostlyhighqualityrice willbe higherthantheunitvaluesrecorded for
the household that bought mostly low quality rice.) This type of data can be (and in fact has been) used to
estimate demand elasticities exploitingthe spatial variation in the data using methods developed by Deaton
(1988).
We base our analysis on consumptiondata from the1993 SUSENAS-- the most recent wave available to
us. The 1993 SUSENAS surveyed 65,600 households throughout the entire country. We have reduced our
sample to the 58,100 households that have sufficient consumption and household information for the the
analysis which follows. To the extent that consumptionpatterns change over time, we are concerned about
theaccuracy ofusing1993consumptiondatato measurebehaviorin1997. Weinvestigatethisby examining
expenditure patterns as they evolved over the course of prior waves of the SUSENAS. We found some
definite trends. In particular, the proportion of expenditure on food decreases slightly but steadily across
each SUSENAS. Thisis probablydueto risingreal incomes. Thesetrends may have persisteduntil1997. To
the extent that our consumption baskets are calculated with 1993 and not 1997 data, our measured impacts
of the crisis will diverge from the actual impacts. However one of our primary concerns is to highlight
the heterogeneous effects of the crisis among households. The relative consumption baskets (among rich
1 A special wave of the Indonesia Family Life Survey was conducted in late 1998 to investigate the immediate effects of the crisis.
This data set, a true panel of households, can compare household consumption in late 1998 to a corresponding period one year earlier.
Frankenberg, et al. (1999) summarize the initial findings. The study surveys 1900 households in 7 provinces and thus does not provide
the geographic coverage or sample size suitable for our purposes.
2 A survey was also conducted in 1996, but we have not been provided with those data yet.
3 For 203 individual food items, the survey recorded the quantity and value consumed by the household in the last week. For 89
individual and aggregate non-food items, the survey recorded annual expenditures as well as expenditures in the month preceding
the survey. For those households that consumed their own self-produced food, the survey imputed the value of that food. For those
households that owned housing, SUSENAS imputed a monthly rental payment.
4and poor households, or rural and urban households) did not change as much as the absolute consumption
baskets over the 1993-97 period and as such the bias along this dimensions is likelyto be slight.
We also have very recent price data that has been supplied by the Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS). The price
data containmonthlyprice observationsfor 44citiesthroughoutthecountryover theperiodJanuary 1997to
October 1998. This time period, which begins before the advent of the crisis, spans the steep devaluationof
the Rupiah and subsequentstabilizationat the new higher rate. We employ a single price change measure--
the percent change in prices from January 1997 to October 1998. By adoptingsuch a long time period from
before the onset of rapid inflation until after the inflation had largely abated, we hope to capture a robust
measure of the price changes brought on by the crisis.
The price data supplies price information for both aggregate goods, such as food or housing, as well
as individual goods such as cassava or petrol. There are approximately 700 goods with observed prices in
the data. However, the types of goods observed varies by city, perhaps reflecting taste and consumption
heterogeneity throughout the country. On average, a particular city has price information on about 350
goods. Jakarta has as many as 440 goodslisted while some small cities only have price informationfor 300
goods.
Each of the 27 Indonesian provinces is represented by at least one city in the price data. In order to
match households from the SUSENAS data to as local a price change as possible, we calculate province
specific price changes from the city-level data. For those provincesthat have only one provincial city in the
price data, we take those price changes as representative of the whole province. For those provinces with
more than one city in the price data, we calculate an average provincial price change using city specific
1996 populationweights.
The accuracy of this extrapolation of city price data to an entire province will surely vary with the
size and characteristics of the province considered. For example, Jakarta, the national capital, is also its
own province, and the observed price changes may fairly accurately represent the price changes faced by
residents throughout the province. On the other hand, the price changes for Irian Jaya, a vast mountainous
province, are based on price changes observed in the provincial capital Jayapura. Price changes in the
provincial capital may not be a completely accurate proxy for price changes in remote rural areas. Indeed, a
recent study suggests that overall inflation in rural areas is approximately five percent higher than in urban
areas (Frankenberg, et al., 1999).
4 We frequently report separate results for the urban and rural poor, and
the fact that the price data were collected in the cities should be kept in mind as those results are reviewed.
4 The same study also presents some evidence that the BPS price data may understate inflation by as much as 15 percent. To the
extent that this is true, the impact of the crisis is even greater than measured here.
5For certain groups of goods the price data are more disaggregated than the consumption data reported
in the SUSENAS. In order to link the new price data with the existing consumption data, we use the prices
for those commodities which appear in both the price data set and in the SUSENAS. In some cases, we also
aggregate commodities in the price data to match a product category in the SUSENAS data.
5 The match
between the price data and the consumption data is good, but not perfect. We find that we have detailed
price data for most, but not all, of the goods that comprise a household’s total expenditure. On average,
expenditures on matched goods accounts for 75 percent of a household’s total expenditure. We return to
this point later.
4. Methodologies
Given our data sources, the usual approach to investigatinghow the Indonesian poor were impacted by the
recent crisis would be to do the following. First, one would estimate a demand system-- ideally one based
on an underlying utility-consistent framework. The SUSENAS surveys would provide the data for such a
demand system. Based on the estimated elasticities from that demand system, one would then estimate the
welfare impact of the price changes that occurred recently in Indonesia. Special emphasis would be placed
on how the poor were impacted by the crisis. It turns out that there are some very severe problems with this
approach given the data and the policy goals. In order to better motivate what we do do, we first highlight
the problems with the approach outlinedabove.
Estimating demand elasticities from the SUSENAS is not an especially satisfying endeavor. The
SUSENAS is a cross-sectional survey of households. While we do have multiple waves, there is no panel,
or time-series, nature to the data. As noted above, the SUSENAS contains data on expenditures and on
quantitiesconsumed, but not on prices. Expenditures dividedby quantitiesgive unit values and, as outlined
in Deaton (1988), there is a misguided temptation to use these unit values as prices. As noted earlier, a
naive swap between unit values and prices is wrong because unit values reflect the qualityof the product as
well as the market price. Deaton shows that under the appropriate separability conditions, one can exploit
the spatial nature of the data to back out the true price elasticities. The idea is that within a geographic unit,
say a village, the prices will be the same, althoughthey are unobserved by the econometrician. Unit values,
though, will differ across householdswithin the village. This within variation allows the econometrician to
identify the quality effect-- incomes vary and the observed unit values vary, but by assumption underlying
prices are the same. The variation across villages, controlling for village fixed effects, allows one to then
back out the true price elasticities, since the real price variation occurs only through the spatial dimension.
5 In these cases, we take simple averages of the products that comprise a single product in the SUSENAS data.
6All of this leads to a multi-step estimation algorithm developed by Deaton (1988). The estimator employed
deals quite carefully with the errors-in-variables issues that the use of unit values raises.
So what’stheproblem? Thismethodologyisprobablythebestavailable,butithassome realdrawbacks.
From an economic perspective, it is troubling that the resulting demand elasticities are not consistent with
an underlying utility framework. If at the end of the day one wants to compute a welfare measure such as
compensating or equivalent variation, one needs to work with a framework that allows the researcher to
identifythe primitivesof the underlyingutilityfunction. From an econometric perspective, it is problematic
that the methodology does not deal with the endogeneity of product quality. Consumers choose the quality
as well as quantity of the products bought and this induces the usual simultaneity concerns. These issues,
though, are perhaps just academic quibbles. The bigger problems arise due to the policy application at
hand. Recall, we are concerned with better understanding how the price changes impacted the poor. There
are at least three reasons that the methodology is ill-suited to adequately addressing this concern. First,
the estimated elasticities are essentially local approximations based on consumer behavior at the observed
prices. Hence the SUSENAS might give prettygoodestimates of how householdsrespondto a price change
on the order of five percent. When the price changes under consideration are instead on the order to 100 to
300 percent, the answer is essentially dictated by the choice of functional forms. This is troublingfor most
any parametric approach to the estimation of demand elasticities. Second, the underlying framework is one
ofarepresentativeconsumer. Ourconcern,though,iswithanythingbuttherepresentativeconsumer. Rather,
we are especially focused on the very poor. Fitzgerald wrote that the rich are different. So, we suspect,
are the poor. A demand system that explicitly considers consumer heterogeneity is called for, but is not
currentlyavailable. Finally,it isnot feasibleto estimateacompletedemand systemat ahighlydisaggregated
product level. There are simply too many products. The obvious solution is to aggregate products, but this
aggregation hides very important variation in consumption patterns and price changes. Alternatively, one
can estimate own price elasticities(but not cross-price elasticities) for many disaggregated products.
We have done such an exercise with the SUSENAS data. Employing a simple OLS framework,
and controlling for some observed household characteristics, we have estimated own price elasticities
for individual food items. We do not attempt to correct for the quality effects discussed above. The
elasticities, identified by the cross-sectional variation in unit values and quantities, yield the expected
negative coefficients and are quite precisely estimated. For example we estimated the own-price elasticity
forrice tobe -0.43withastandarderrorof.02, whilethesame estimateforgroundcoffee yieldsa coefficient
of -.84 with a standard error of .01. Most of the point estimates for the 193 food items fall between -.3
and -.8. Only a handful of estimates exceed -1, perhaps indicating relatively inelastic demand even at the
most disaggregate level. When the analysis includes fixed effects for each district (kabupaten), the point
7estimates, still precisely estimated, tend to be a bit larger in absolute value but still very few exceed an
estimate of -1.
6 Of course these estimated own price elasticities, like most parametric approaches, are
subject to the some of the problems mentioned above.
Our principal approach in this paper is non-parametric. As with the econometric approach outlined
above, we will need to assume that the 1993 SUSENAS survey provides a reasonably accurate picture of
consumptionpatterns before the crisis. We then use the price changes that actually occurred to predict who
the price changes would have impacted. This approach has both advantages and disadvantages. On the
upside, it does not rely on functional forms and we can more easily explore the three types of heterogeneity
listed above. On the down-side, it essentially ignores the possibility of substituting away from relatively
more expensive goods. As such, our method will provide an upper bound on the predicted impacts of the
price changes on the poor.
The best approach is to combine the heterogeneity highlighted with the non-parametric approach with
thestructuraleconomicrelationshipsestimatedbytheeconometricapproach. We’lldothis,andthisexercise
has convinced us of the need to do this, but it is a longer-term project.
5. Heterogeneity
Ourmethodsare motivatedbyourdesiretocapturetheheterogeneityinprices,products,andconsumers. We
begin our analysis by simply documenting the extent of this heterogeneity. This serves two functions. First,
it illustrates the importance of using methods that do not aggregate across the dimensions of heterogeneity.
Second, it highlights exactly which sorts of heterogeneity are most important, and this will inform our
analysis of the price changes.
Price heterogeneity across regions
We begin by analyzing how prices for narrowly defined products vary across Indonesia over the course of
the financial crisis. The raw data that are used for this exercise are monthly prices for about 700 products
that are collected on a city basis by the BPS. These data are used to then create the official consumer price
indices for the entire country. Monthly prices for so many products in very many cities constitute a rather
unwieldlydata set. We have aggregated the data in 3 dimensions. In terms of the time-series dimension, we
simply computed the price change for each product for the period spanning January 1997 to October 1998.
Hence the 22 monthly price changes were reduced to one price change that spanned from before the crisis
to the most recent data. This simplification is not without costs, for the reduced data set is no longer able to
6 A positive correlation between unobserved quality and price might also bias our estimates toward zero.
8address questionsabout the timing of price changes across provinces. It may have taken more time for price
increases tohave occurred inthe more distantprovinces,and thissortof informationisnolonger retrievable
with the reduced data set. In the geographic dimension, we have aggregated to create price series for each
of 27 provinces as explained above. In the product dimension, for some analysiswe have collapsed the 700
or so products into approximately 180 products or aggregates that we are able to match with goods in the
consumptiondata (SUSENAS).
The price data are reported in levels, but we focus our analysis in this paper on changes. There is little
doubt that some places are more expensive to live in than others. Our interest, though, is whether the
financial crisis had a differential impact on different regions of Indonesia. Hence, price changes seem the
appropriate focus.
The notion that the overall impact of the financial crisis may have had geographically differential
impactsfindssome empiricalsupportinongoingworkby Poppele, Pritchettand Sumarto at theWorldBank
intheirworkingpaper‘‘Social Impacts ofthe IndonesianCrisis:New Dataand PolicyImplications(1999)".
Relying on data sources different than those used in this paper, Poppele et. al. found that the geographic
impact of the crisis on poverty was quite uneven. We return to these results in section 6 where we evaluate
the impact of the crisis on the poor.
Thegeographicpatternofprice increases differs accordingthethespecificityoftheproductsconsidered.
At the most general level, the price index encompassing all goods does not show much regional variation.
An unweighted average of the general price index for each province shows that prices increased an average
of 92.5 percent from January 1997 to October 1998. The general price index on a province-by-province
basis ranged from an increase of 70 percent in Nusa Tenggara Timor (NTT) to an increase of 119 percent
in East Java. As a base line, the standard error of the series of provincial general price indices is about 11
percent. Figure 1 shows the empirical distributionof the provincial general price index increases. As noted
above, it varies from between 70 percent and 120 percent and most provinces are in the 80 to 100 percent
range. Given the different consumption patterns across provinces and the geographic separation of many
provinces, this does not seem like very much heterogeneity. But this is deceiving.
There are 184productsand productaggregatesthat appear inboththeSUSENAS andourprice data. We
have computed the change in the price index for all of them. The standard error of the change in the price
index, as one looks across provinces, is greater than 11 percent (that of the general price index) in over 170
of them. There are some extreme examples, but one that is more representative and is especially important
is the geographic dispersion of the price increase for rice. Figure 2 shows the empirical distribution of the
percentage changes in the price of rice. It varies from around 110 percent (in South Sumatra) to around
280 percent (in South and Central Kalimantan.) The fact that the price increases of individual products
9show much more geographic variation than that of the overall price index means that the price increases of
productscovary negativelyacross provinces. Loosely speaking, when the price of one product goes up a lot
in a province, the price of another product goes up by less so that the increase in the general price index is
not that different across provinces.
7
The substantial geographic variation of price increases following the financial crisis has economic
implications. Suppose the poor consume a similar basket of goods regardless of where they live. In such
a case, the economic impact of the crisis on the poor may vary substantially across regions. For example,
if the poor always devote a substantial share of their budget to rice, the poor would have been much more
adversely impacted in South and Central Kalimantan than in Sumatra. Alternatively, if the poor consume
very different baskets of goods in different regions, spatial price variation may in fact be coupled with a
fairly uniform impact of the crisis on the poor. Further, if the poor are not evenly distributed across the
provinces (and they are not), the geographic variation in prices has an additional impact which can serve to
either mute or exacerbate the impact of the crisis on the poor.
8
Product heterogeneity across productaggregates
The previous sub-section documented the spatial variation of prices. The general price index did not vary
that much across provinces, butthe prices of individualgoodsdid. Thisfindinghas implicationsfor product
aggregation. If onewishes to estimate a demand system, some product aggregation is necessary. It is simply
too hard to estimate a demand system for 184 (much less the original 700!) products complete with the
all-important cross-price elasticities. One common practice is to aggregate products into groups such as
‘‘food,’’ ‘‘housing,’’‘‘clothing,’’andthelike. Onecan thenestimateademand systemusingtheaggregated
products. This is a relatively attractive option when the products that underlie the aggregate have price
changes that are somewhat uniform. That is simply not the case in the Indonesian data. In this section,
we document this finding and explain some economic implicationsof product heterogeneity across product
aggregates. Like the spatial heterogeneity documented in the previous section, this type of heterogeneity
also informs the methodology we use to investigatethe impact of the crisis on the poor.
7 An alternative explanation, which we have investigated and rejected, issomewhat more complicated. There are about 700 products
that comprise the overall price index. Not all of these appear in the SUSENAS consumption data. It could have been the case that
the products that contribute to the general price index but do not appear in our our consumption data contribute to the dampening
of the variance of the general price index. This would happen if the excluded products had price increases that negatively covaried
with the included products. We have gone back and investigated this possibility using all 700 prices and while there is some negative
covariance between the price increases of included and excluded products, it is modest and does not explain the dampened variance of
the province-level general price index.
8 The spatial variation in price changes might in principal help to econometrically identify demand elasticities, but this would
require concurrent (and unavailable) data on household expenditures.
10The price data have seven aggregate commodities which in turn sum to the general price index. These
aggregates are foodstuffs, prepared food, housing, clothing, health services, education and recreation, and
transportation.Eachoftheseiscomprisedof manyindividualproducts. Thedegree ofdisaggregationvaries.
There are 262 individualitems under ‘‘foodstuffs’’ while there only about 40 or 50 for Health Services and
for Transportation.
In order to abstract from heterogeneity across provinces and focus on the heterogeneity at the product
level, we first collapse the data set and consider only the average price increase for each product when the
average is taken across provinces. Hence, we compute the average increase in the price of the aggregate
‘‘foodstuff’’ as well as the average price increase in each of the 262 goods that comprise that aggregate.
This removes the spatial dimension of the data. Figure 3 graphically illustrates the heterogeneity of the
price increases of the products that comprise the aggregate for foodstuffs. In Figure 3, one notes that while
one or two products had either price decreases greater than 50 percent or price increases greater than 400
percent, most products had price increases in the 0 to 200 percent range. The results of this aggregation
across provinces for all product categories are provided in Table 2.
Table 2 lists, for each of the seven aggregates, the number of individual products, the average price
increasewhentheaverageistakenacrossalltheproductsthatcomprisetheaggregate, thestandarddeviation
of the price increases, as well as the minimum and maximum price increase. (One should keep in mind that
these standard deviations do not account for the regional variation in price increases, only the variation of
theaverage price increases.) For example, thereare 262productsthatcomprisetheaggregate ‘‘Foodstuffs.’’
Of these 262 products, one had an average price decrease of about 68 percent (a leafy vegetable that defies
English translation) while one had an average increase of over 600 percent (red onions). Of all foodstuffs,
the average price increase was 114 percent and the standard deviation of the price increase was about 80
percent. There was, in sum, tremendous variation in the average price changes of individual food items.
This pattern holds for all of the aggregate commodities.
Once we have abstracted from spatial price variation, we have seen that how much prices increase
depends on the degree of aggregation with which we define a product. This too has economic implications.
Consider foodstuffs as an example. If poor households consume a different basket of specific food items
than do the non-poor, the poor may be quite differentially impacted by the crisis. Perhaps the food items
whose prices most skyrocketed were imported luxury items while the price rise for basic stables was more
modest. Using an aggregate for foods will hide this important source of heterogeneity. This reasoning
suggests that one should examine the impact of the crisis at the most disaggregated level. There is, though,
a line of reasoning that works in the opposite direction. The methodology we use to investigate the impact
of the crisis on the poor essentially assumes that there is no substitutabilityamong goods (this is discussed
11in some detail below). While the assumption of perfectly inelastic demands is clearly not correct, it is less
incorrect as goods are more broadly defined. For these competing reasons, we analyze the impact of the
crisis at different levels of product aggregation.
Heterogeneity across households
The above two sections have documented the heterogeneity of prices across provinces and within product
aggregates. The purpose of this section is to illustrate the heterogeneity of households in the sample. One
can either do this correctly, and write the ensuing book, or be too brief while givinga glimpse into relevant
dimensionsof householdheterogeneity. Our choice will be obvious.
Table 3 quantifies how a handful of household characteristics vary across the population, both overall
and by income groups. The first column gives the (weighted)
9 means of per-capita household income,
expenditure, whether the head of the householdhad completed secondary school, the size of the household,
the budgetshare of food in totalexpenditure, whether the householdwas rural, and the age of the household
head. Means are reported for three separate deciles in the income distribution,as well as the overall sample.
The sample is made up of the 58,100 households (from SUSENAS) included in the subsequent analysis.
Table 3 indicates that income is quite unequally distributed as the average income at the top decile is
almost 12 times that of the bottom decile. Expenditure is less unequally distributed. Only about 25 percent
of the very poor household heads have graduated secondary school while almost 75 percent of those in the
top decile have done so. Richer households are smaller. (We have defined household size as the number
of adults plus one half times the number of children.) About 90 percent of the households in the bottom
decile are rural while about 70 percent of those in the top decile are urban. Householdsin the bottom decile
devote about 85 percent of their income to food while those in the top devote onlya bit more than one-third
that share. As noted in Table 1, the CPI for food rose by more than the CPI for other categories, and this
alone suggests that at this very aggregated level, the poor may have been more adversely impacted by the
financial crisis.
As importantas the averages across decilesreported in Table 3 are the standarderrors of these averages.
Even within households in the poorest decile, there is tremendous variation in the income share devoted to
food consumption, the household size, the age of the head of the household, and whether the household
head has completed secondary school. The very poor are themselves a quite heterogeneous group.
The poorest households don’t just spend a larger share of their budget on food than middle and high
income households but, as mentioned earlier, they also purchase a very different basket of products. Even
9 When computing means, we use the sampling weights reported by SUSENAS.
12within the category of food, poor households typically buy different items than do wealthier households.
Thisis apparent inTable 4, whichpresents themean expenditureshares for the overall sample as well as for
those householdsin the top and bottom per-capita householdincome deciles. As expected, poor households
spend a greater share of total expenditures on food than rich households(68 percent for those in the bottom
decile compared with 47 percent in the top decile).
1
0 Even within food items, spending patterns vary by
income level. The poor spend a far greater share on basic foodstuffs such as cereals and tubers (30 percent
of all expenditures)thanthe wealthy (7 percent). Indeed expendituresonrice alone comprise a quarter of all
expenditures for poor householdscompared with 6 percent for the wealthy. In contrast, the wealthy devote
more than twice the expenditureshare as the poor to meat, eggs and milk, and prepared food and beverages.
Amongnon-foodexpenditures,thewealthydevoteproportionatelymore resourcestohousingandeducation
and are more reliant on electricity and gasoline (for transport), while the poor spend significantly higher
proportions on kerosene and firewood. Because the prices of individual products do not all move together,
the fact that richer and poorer householdsbuy different products suggeststhat the financial crisis may have
differentially impacted richer and poorer households in a complicated way. If one could simply multiply
the poor’s consumption basket by some scalar to get the rich’s consumption basket, untangling the impact
of the financial crisis on the poor would be simpler. But that is not the case.
6. Changes in the Cost-of-Living and the Impact of the Crisis on the Poor
The purpose of the previous section has been to establish that: i) Price changes varied a great deal across
Indonesian provinces so that where a household lived may matter when evaluating the impact of the
financial crisis; ii) Price changes varied a great deal depending on how one aggregates products so that the
degree of disaggregation of product definition matters when evaluating the impact of the financial crisis;
and iii) Households themselves are very heterogeneous so that a methodology investigating the impact of
the financial crisis should accommodate this heterogeneity. With these concerns in mind, we now turn to
measuring the impact of the crisis on the poor.
We measure the impact of the crisis on households (rich and poor) by computing household-level
cost-of-living indices. Because we only have data on consumption patterns well before the crisis, we use
thesepre-crisis consumptionbasketstocomputewhatisessentiallya Lespeyrescost-of-livingindexforeach
household. This index provides a maximum bound on the impact of the crisis, since the index does not take
into account the substitution toward relatively less costly products that surely takes place (to some extent)
1
0 Since we are now looking at food outlays as a share of total expenditures, and not income, the figures here will differ from those
in Table 3.
13after price increases. Denoting the price of good
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We compute 58,100 cost-of-livingindices, or as many indices as there are householdsin our sample.
We actually compute three such household level indices. The first index that we compute matches the
price changes of goods in the price data with the monthly expenditures of those same goods in the 1993
SUSENAS. Forthemonthlyexpenditureoffooditems,we simplyconverttherecordedweeklyexpenditures
tomonthlyequivalents.For non-fooditems, we use themonthlyaverage of annualexpenditures,andnotthe
expenditures in the month preceding the survey, in order to more accurately measure monthly expenditures
for durables that are infrequently purchased. We attempt to match goods across the two data sets at the
lowest level of aggregation possible. For the case of food (both raw and prepared), we were able to match
132 different individual goods between the two data sets. In the case of non-food items, we matched 52
different goods, both individual goods such as firewood and kerosene, as well as aggregate goods such as
toiletries or men’s clothing. Hence, the
i subscript in the Lespeyres formula above runs from 1 to 184.
Through this matching, we were able to account for 75 percent of total householdexpenditures on average--
a little greater for poor households and a little less for rich ones. This index is then an average of the
observed price changes with each price change weighted by the household specific expenditure share for
that good.
The second index is computed for the case in which we use 19 aggregate commodities instead of
the original 184 which we matched between SUSENAS and the BPS price data. These aggregates
include 15 food categories, such as cereals and meat, and 4 non-food categories such as housing and
clothing. The motivation for this is twofold. First, recall the Lespeyres index, by construction, ignores
substitutability across products. By defining products more broadly, as in the second index, we reduce
the likely overstatement of the impact of the crisis. Put another way, when products are broadly defined,
those aggregates are going to be less elastically demanded than the disaggregated products. The second
motivation for this index stems from the fact that the disaggregated index only accounted for about 75
percent of households’ expenditures. It is possible that for many households, the goods excluded in index
1 may either exacerbate or mitigate the measured welfare effects, depending on the relative price changes
of those goods. The expenditures for these aggregates (i.e. meat, cereals, housing, etc.) are also supplied
by the 1993 SUSENAS and the price changes for these aggregates are found in the price data. A benefit
of this index is that it covers nearly 100 percent of the individual household’s expenditures. Of course, by
14attempting to compensate for the above potential biases, we may be introducing another bias-- aggregation
bias-- which we have also previously discussed.
The third index that we compute accounts for the services provided by owner-occupied housingand for
self-produced agriculture. Many households, especially in rural areas, own their home. Although the price
of housing has increased these households are, in an absolute sense, perhaps not better off (they are still
living in the same house). However these households are better off relative to those who do not own their
home. We accountfortheservicesprovidedbyowner-occupiedhousingbytreatingtheimputedrentalvalue
for these homes as a negative expenditure. Many households produce some of their own food. Over 90
percent of these households are classified as rural. Households that consume self-produced foodstuffs also
tend to be net exporters of agricultural products.
1
1 As the price of food rose, the value of their production
also increased. Clearly, if the household was a net exporter of food, the household would benefit from the
price increase. To the extent that a householdproduced some of its own food, such production would mute
the impact of price increases relative to a household that purchased food in the market. We modify the first
indexto account for self-producedagriculturalproductsby treatingthe imputedvalue of self-produced food
as a negative expenditure.
1
2 Note that this modified index will understate the effects of the price increases
to the extent that we do not observe nor adjustfor price increases of intermediate inputsused in agricultural
production. On the other hand, this index does not allow supply responses to the increased food prices and
one would expect more self-productionin the goodswhose relative prices increased the most.
Non-ParametricEvidence
Figure 4 provides kernel density estimates of the first and third indices. The biggest difference between
the two densities is the existence of households that are better off after the crisis due to the consumption
of self-produced (and now more expensive) agricultural goods. While there are not very many of these
households (less than ten percent of the sample), they are non-negligible. More generally, including
householdproduction muted the cost-of-livingincreases and this was especially true in the rural areas.





1 54 percent (weighted) of households in the sample report operating an agricultural business. 69 percent (weighted) of those
households report income from the sale of agricultural goods.
1
2 There is a long standing debate over whether shadow prices in rural households engaged in agricultural production equate market
prices for agricultural inputs such as labor or land. To the extent that these shadow prices may diverge from market prices, the
"valuation" for self-produced food, based on market prices, will not be entirely accurate. Benjamin (1992) presents evidence from rural
Java that household shadow prices for agricultural inputs such as labor are not significantly different from market prices.
1
3 We use income to measure ‘‘poor’’ and ‘‘non-poor’’ although we are well aware of the controversy around this definition. Our
results were substantively the same when we looked at expenditure or food-related expenditure instead of income. See Chaudhuri and
Ravallion (1994) for an investigation of the relative merits of these various poverty indicators.
15from the crisis may have differentially impacted rural and urban areas, we report separate results for rural
and urban households. When we do not take into account self-production and use disaggregated product
definitions(Index1), wefindthatthecost-of-livingforthepooresturbanhouseholdsincreasedanaverageof
128 percent from the January 1997 through October 1998 period. The increase for urban households in the
top income decile was 89 percent. Among rural households,where the overall cost-of-livingincreases were
greater, the parallel figures are 136 percent for the poorest and 107 percent for the wealthiest households.
For both rural and urban households, we find that the increase in the cost-of-living declines monotonically
by income decile. Hence in both areas, the poorer a household was, the greater was the increase in its cost
of living.
The middle columns of Table 5 (Index 2) use the more aggregated product definitions. The results are
very similar to those using the disaggregated product definitions, although the differences across income
deciles are mitigated, mostly because wealthier households in both areas now have somewhat higher
cost-of-living increases. The overall similarities between the two indices are striking given that Index 2
employs broadly aggregate goods demanded less elastically than the individual goods of Index 1. Thus,
while the Lespeyres index is, by construction, an overestimate of the true change in the cost-of-living, the
biasmay notbe huge. Indeed, theaverages ofthe thefirstand secondindicesare almostidentical.It remains
the case that the poorer householdssaw their cost-of-livingincrease by more than didwealthier households.
The final two columns of Table 5 now account for housing services and self-produced food. As
suggested by the kernel density estimates in Figure 4, the increases in the cost-of-living are substantially
muted relative to the figures for Index 1 in both areas, although this is especially true for rural households
duetothe tendencyof rural householdstoengageinagriculturalproduction.Theaverage increase fallsfrom
120 percent in index 1 to 84 percent. (In results not reported here, we find that it is indeed self-produced
agriculture and not owner-occupied housing that accounts for most of the difference between the indices.)
Interestingly, for rural households there is no longer a differential impact across the income spectrum.
Indeed the cost-of-livingincrease is now slightly greater for the wealthier rural households suggestingthat
self-productionhas equalized the impact of the financial crisis across the income deciles in rural areas. The
story is quite different for urban households,however, where there is still a clear monotonicdecrease in the
changes in cost-of-living. The cost-of-living for the poorest urban households increased 111 percent while
the wealthiest households faced an increase of only 80 percent. It is important to note that the cost of living
increases for the wealthy urban households are greater than those measured for the poor or median rural
households. Thus this index suggests the impacts of the crisis have been greater for urban areas than rural,
and greatest overall for the urban poor.
16We turn now from variation across household income to the regional variation in the cost-of-living
indices. Table 6 gives the change in the cost-of-living index for urban and rural households in each
province. As an example, using Index 1 (disaggregated products and no correction for housing services
or self-production), the cost of living for urban households in Aceh increased 102 percent while for rural
households it increased 125 percent. For most provinces, Index 1 and Index 2 (with aggregated products)
give similar results. Similar to Table 5, we find that when we do not account for housing services and
self-production, rural households consistently faced greater increases in their cost-of-living than did their
provincial urban counterparts. Our Index 1 results suggest that there was substantial regional variation in
the the cost-of-living. In Irian Jaya, to the far east, the increase in urban cost-of-living measured 75 percent
while in Southeast Sulawesi, the increase was 138 percent. The regional variation for rural households is
equally dramatic. In Southeast Sulawesi, rural households faced a 161 percent cost-of-living increase while
in Irian Jaya the increase was only 91 percent.
When we focus on an index that accounts for housing services and self-produced agriculture (Index 3),
the regional variation remains, but the urban-rural comparison is changed. The depreciation of the Rupiah
helped export-orientedprovincesand the increased cost of food was offset by householdproductionin rural
areas. In every province,rural householdsfaced a smaller increase in theircost-of-livingindex than did their
urban counterparts.In some provinces, thedifferences are especiallylarge. In EastTimor andIrian Jaya, the
cost-of-livingfor rural householdonlyincreased about39 percent. The patternof regionalvariationremains
as other provinces had increases (for rural households)more than double that.
We view the particular results for some provinces with some caution as our results do not always
coincide with the results reported by Poppele, Prichett and Sumarto (1999). For example, Poppele et. al.
report that on Sulawesi, 70 percent of rural Kecamatans reported that things were better in August 1998
than they were a year prior. Although these measures are subjective, this figure is hard to reconcile with
our cost-of-living changes. Overall, the Poppele et al. results suggest substantial regional variation (as do
we) and that rural households fared relatively better (as do we once we account for household production.)
These general findingsare also echoed in Frankenberg, et al. (1999).
It might be interesting to investigate how the provincial and regional changes in the cost-of-living
reported here vary with other provincial characteristics such as mean income or expenditure levels. Have
wealthier or poorer regions of the country experienced higher cost-of-living increases? For rural areas,
there is little correlation between mean per capita household income or expenditures and increases in mean
cost-of-living.However for urban areas the cost-of-livingchanges are postivelyand significantlycorrelated
with provincial mean household income (and expenditures to a lesser extent). Thus urban areas with lower
average household income experienced greater price changes than the more wealthy cities. These findings
17hold true for any of the three indices. Another provincial characteristic more sensitive to the distribution
of income within the province are poverty indicators such as the population share categorized as poor.
What might be the relation between regional variation in price changes and regional variation in poverty?
We take as our poverty measure the population share deemed poor by Bidani and Ravallion (1993) from
calculations based on the 1990 SUSENAS. Although these poverty indicators pertain to a period seven
years before the currency crisisit is unlikelythat the relative variation in regionalpoverty profiles wouldbe
much changed in the interveningyears. We find no relation between the provincial cost-of-livingincreases
and the provincial poverty indicators for urban areas. We also find no relation between cost-of-living
changes and poverty indicators in rural areas when our cost-of-living is measured by Index 1 or Index 2.
However the cost-of-living changes as determined by Index 3 are negatively and significantly correlated
with the share of rural provincial population deemed poor. Hence provinces with a greater proportion of
poor experienced lower cost-of-living increases than the more well-off rural areas once adjustments for
agricultural self-productionwere made.
ParametricEvidence
The results in Tables 5 and 6 suggestthe crisis impacted the cost-of-livingof the poor more than that of
the rich, at least for indices 1 and 2, and urban householdsmore than rural ones, after we account for owned
housing and self-produced food. In order to investigate how the cost-of-living varies conditional on more
than one household attribute, regression analysis is helpful. Our approach is simple and descriptive. It is
withoutstructural interpretation.
Regression results are summarized in Table 7.
1
4 The top half of Table 7 includes results using the
cost-of-living index that does not account for housing services or self-produced food. We include three
specifications and two estimation methods. All specifications are linear with the index being regressed on
two to four explanatoryvariables. In each specification,we includethe log of income and a dummy variable
which takes a value of one if the household is rural. (We use the actual index instead of its log since the
index when accounting for self-production may be negative.) In the most parsimonious specification, OLS
yieldsa coefficientof -0.100 onlogincome and 0.163onthe rural dummy variable. Eachare quiteprecisely
estimated. The coefficient on log income has a natural interpretation. The negative sign on the coefficient
indicates that the cost-of-livingrises with declines in income. The poor are harmed most. A value of -0.100
indicates that as income doubles (a 100 percent increase), the cost-of-livingindex falls by 10 points (0.10).
The coefficient of -0.10 is large when considered in conjunction with the range of incomes. At the tenth
1
4 The regressions reported in Table 7 are not weighted by sampling weights, but we find that doing so makes little to no substantive
difference in the results.
18percentile, household income is 75,802 while it is only 101,667 at the twentieth percentile. At the 80th
and 90th percentile, income is 324,167 and 460,656. These large absolute differences translate into large
differences in the cost-of-living. Since income is easily five times larger at the high end of the distribution
than at the low end, the -0.100 coefficient corresponds to a cost-of-living index that is 50 points higher for
poor households. This strikes us as a large disparity in the cost-of-living. The coefficient on ‘‘rural’’, still
in the simplest OLS specification, is 0.163 indicating that rural households have a cost-of-living increase




Our main focus is on how robust these results are to other specifications. Because we are not being
guided by theory, the decision of which other regressors might be included in the regression is essentially
arbitrary. Insofar as included regressors might co-vary with income or rural location, the coefficients on
log income and the rural dummy might change. We include two additional regressors. One is the log of
householdsizewherechildrenunder10arecountedasonehalfandadultsasone. Theotherincludedvariable
(‘‘Degree’’) is a dummy variable set to one if the head of the household is a secondary school graduate.
We find that the inclusion of household size increases (in absolute value) the coefficient on log income to
-0.151. The coefficient on the rural dummy remains relatively stable. Household size itself conditionally
covaries positivelywith the price index. Larger householdsface larger cost-of-livingincreases. Controlling
also for the education of the head of the household has virtuallyno impact on the other coefficients.
There is good reason to believe that the residuals of the regression may be correlated by province. This
wouldbeconsistentwiththesubstantialregionalvariationthatwefoundinearlier cutsofthedata. Provinces
seem to matter. For this reason, we estimated all specifications with a province fixed effects estimator. This
effectively sweeps out any cross-province variation so the estimates instead capture only within province
variation. We find that the inclusion of province fixed effects makes remarkably little difference to the
estimates. All coefficients are about the same as with OLS. Put another way, the variation in the data that
gave rise to the OLS estimates also exists at the province level.
In the bottom half of Table 7, we use the cost-of-living index that accounts for housing services and
self-produced agriculture (Index 3). The results are broadly consistent with those in Tables 5 and 6. We
focus first on the OLS estimates. In our most parsimoniousspecification, we find that the coefficient on log
income is -0.046 while the coefficient on the rural dummy variable is -0.214. Hence if household income
doubles, the cost of livingdecreases 4 points. As income at the tenth percentile is about one sixththat at the
1


































: All coefficients were precisely estimated. Hence, the
negative relationship between income and the price index is muted in rural areas and the negative relationship between the price index
and the rural dummy is muted as income rises.
19ninetiethpercentile, these resultsindicate that the cost of livingis about 25 points(0.25) higher for the very
poor. This is a large difference since the mean of the cost-of-livingindex is only 0.83. The OLS coefficient
on log income is stable across specifications and is always precisely estimated. The coefficients on log
income are alwayssmaller withthe index that includesself-productionand thisis consistentwith the notion
that self-productionmutes the impact of the crisis on the poor. It remains the case, though, that the poor are
more adversely impacted than the wealthy.
When we include housing services and self-production, the coefficient on the rural dummy variable
becomes negative. Hence, when accounting for these influences, urban households faced a higher cost of
living. The difference is on the order of 20 points which, again, is large given the mean of the index (.83).
This coefficient is also stable across specifications. That the crisis impacted urban households more than
rural ones is consistentwith the preliminary results of Poppele et. al. (1999) as well as with Frankenberg et.
al. (1999). We find that household size no longer seems to matter and that the coefficient on the education
of the head of household becomes negative. The former effect is consistent with larger households having
more housing services and self-produced agriculture. The later effect is consistent with higher education
households engaging in less self-production. Finally, including provincial fixed effects mutes the impact
of log income but it remains the case that the coefficient is precisely estimated and negative. Little else
changes with the fixed effects.
7. Conclusions and Caveats
Conclusions
The recent financial crisis in Indonesia has resulted in dramatic price increases. When we ask if these
price increases have impacted the cost-of-living of poor households disproportionatelyhard, the answer is
usually "Yes." Just how hard the poor have been hit, though, depends crucially on where the household
lives, whether the householdis in a rural or urban area, and justhow the cost-of-livingis computed. What is
clear is that the notion that the very poor are so poor as to be insulated from international shocks is simply
wrong. Rather, in the Indonesian case, the very poor appear the most vulnerable.
Our results emphasize the importance of heterogeneity when measuring the impact of the Indonesian
economic crisis on households. We find that prices vary substantially across the disparate regions of
Indonesia. Prices also vary across the types of goods considered. Households are also quite heterogeneous,
even withinincomedeciles, withrespect toobservablecharacteristics. Ontopof thisvariation,consumption
patterns vary both regionally as well as by income class. For these reasons, we find it most helpful to think
20about distributionsofresponsesand wehaveemployedmethodsthat,inmostcases, donotrelyonparticular
parametric assumptions.
By matchingdataonprice changeswithdataonhouseholdconsumptionfrom a nationallyrepresentative
Indonesiandata source, we have calculatedhouseholdspecificcost-of-livingincreases. Since our measure--
a Lespeyres type index-- does not account for potential substitution among products, our figures provide
an upward bound on the likely increase in the cost-of-living. We find a substantial increase in the mean
cost-of-living,on the order of 130 percent, if we disregard the relative benefits of self-produced agriculture
and owned housing. The measured increase is greater for poorer households and households in rural areas.
There is a great deal of provincialvariation in the measured cost-of-livingincreases although,as evidenced
by the the fixed effects estimation results, there is as much variation withinprovinces as between them.
Our results also illustrate the role that agricultural self-production and owned housing played in
dampening the impact of the crisis. When accounting for these benefits, the estimated mean cost-of-living
falls to 84 percent and thiscost is now lower for rural households.Of all households,the urban poor appear
the most adversely impacted by the crisis. Their cost-of-livingtendedto rise the most and, beingpoor, these
householdsare presumably among the least able to absorb these increases.
And Caveats
There are several reasons to view our results with caution. These include the absence of information
about wages and incomes, potential problems with the price data that underlie our indices, the fact that
we used 1993 consumption data to proxy 1997 consumption patterns, the biases inherent in a Lespeyres
index approach, and the confounding influences of shocks other than that of the economic crisis. Each are
discussed in turn.
Wages: This paper has analyzed variations in the changes in nominal prices during the Indonesian
economic crisis. Of course we would also like to know what has happened with wages and income to
better measure the real effects of the crisis. Unfortunately, our data contain no information on the changes
in household income over the course of the crisis. However two alternative sources of data do have
some information on wage changes. Data from the Badan Pusat Statistik (obtained from their web site at
http://www.bps.go.id)reveal that nominalwages formany broadoccupationalclassificationshaveincreased
throughout 1998. For example the reported increase in the mean wage from September 1997 through
September 1998 for industrial workers stands at 26 percent. The median wage has also increased an almost
identical 25 percent. Workers in the basic metal and metal working industries witnessed the highest wage
increases, of about 40 percent, while wages in the paper and chemical industries increased less than 20
percent. There is also extensive regional variation in wage increases. The largest wage gains reported were
21for workers in Sulawesi who experienced increases of 87Jakarta increased only 12increase in wages was
not nearly enough to offset the detrimental effects of the rapid price changes. Frankenberg et al. (1999) find
significanterosion in the real wage, especially for workers in urban areas where the real wage has fallen 30
percent for men and 37 percent for women. The real wage has declined less in rural areas (18 percent for
men and 19 percent for women) although overall wages are still significantlylower for rural workers.
While rising nominal wages will dampen the impact of rising prices, that only helps workers who
actually earn the wages. Workers who instead become unemployed are hit doubly hard. BPS statistics
indicate that unemployment rose from about four million workers in 1997 to over five million in 1998. On
the otherhand, thecrisishas ledto a slightlyhigherproportionof men, and a considerablyhigherproportion
of women, currently working. The increased proportion working is largely due to unpaid family workers
entering the labor force and somewhat mitigatesthe detrimental effects of the decline in real wages and rise
in unemployment. This is apparent in the reported changes in household per capita expenditures, where the
declines, although still significant, are not as large as the declines in wages. According to Frankenberg et
al. (1999) mean per capita household expenditures have fallen 34 percent in urban areas and 13 percent
in rural areas (although the median per capita expenditures have declined only 5 percent and 2 percent for
urban and rural householdsrespectively).
Inaccurate Price Data: Our price data comes from observations in urban areas. Due to the lack of
information on rural prices, we extend these measured price changes to rural areas. However prices in
rural areas, especially remote areas, may behave quite differently. Frankenberg et al. (1999) determine that
overall inflationmay be slightlyhigher (5 percent higher) in rural areas than urban. As well, at least for the
7 provincesfor whichtheyhave some limitedindependentprice data, Frankenberg etal. suggeststhatactual
inflation may be as much as 15 percent higher than the BPS derived inflation estimates. This is another
reason to view our results with caution.
1993 consumption data: We base our household expenditure shares on consumption data from the
1993 SUSENAS. As incomes rise, consumptionpatterns change. This is apparent if we review expenditure
shares over the 1987 to 1993 period, where a smaller proportion of total expenditures is devoted to basic
foodstuffs, such as rice, for all households throughoutthe period-specific income distribution. Up until the
economic crisis this trend was likely to continue. To the extent that our consumptionbaskets are calculated
with 1993 and not 1997 data, our measured impacts of the crisis will diverge from the actual impacts.
However we are also concerned with the heterogeneouseffects of the crisisamong households,and as such,
the relative consumption baskets (among rich and poor households, or rural and urban households) are not
likely to have changed as much as the absolute consumptionbaskets over the 1993-97 period.
22The Lespeyres Index: We have examined the impact of the crisis with price data that both pre- and
post-date the crisis, but we do not observe quantities corresponding the the higher prices. For households
that do not engage in any self-production (which would include virtually all urban households), this means
that our cost-of-livingindex is an upper bound on the true change in the cost of living. For households that
do engage in agricultural self-production,the bias is lessened.
Not a controlled experiment: It is easy to forget that the Indonesian economic crisis was not the only
change in the economic environment over this period. Concurrent with the crisis, some areas of Indonesia
were hard hit byforest fires and othersby drought.These and otherdisastersimpact prices sothat notallthe
price changes we observe in the data are due solely to the economic crisis. Put another way, prices would
have changed some even absent the crisis.
For all of these reasons (and surely more), one should view our results with some caution. On the other
hand, the severity of the crisis and the sheer magnitude of the impacted population argue for presenting
some evidence given the currently available data. That has been one aim of this paper. Another was to
document the high degree of heterogeneity in the effects of the crisis across such dimensions as region,
householdlocation, and income.
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24</ref_section>TABLE 1
Some Background
Rupiah Exchange Rates CPI for
USD 100 Yen Food Housing Clothing Health
Dec. 1996 2,383.00 2,058.39 100.52 101.98 100.99 102.08
Jan. 1997 2,396.00 1,965.56 103.33 102.67 101.91 104.46
Feb. 2,406.00 2,000.63 105.99 102.90 102.43 105.32
Mar. 2,419.00 1,955.92 105.28 103.29 102.64 105.59
Apr. 2,433.00 1,921.19 105.24 103.99 102.62 107.56
May 2,440.00 2,095.15 105.30 104.82 102.71 107.69
Jun. 2,450.00 2,148.49 104.45 105.18 102.88 108.15
Jul. 2,599.00 2,210.83 105.93 105.82 102.80 108.41
Aug. 3,035.00 2,546.48 107.60 106.34 103.48 108.77
Sep. 3,275.00 2,715.56 109.59 107.58 104.56 109.21
Oct. 3,670.00 3,061.33 113.50 108.35 107.14 110.67
Nov. 3,648.00 2,867.48 117.25 106.82 107.01 112.27
Dec. 4,650.00 3,578.31 120.54 107.84 110.58 114.18
Jan. 1998 10,375.00 8,304.99 133.26 113.79 127.30 124.22
Feb. 8,750.00 6,895.21 157.79 123.28 145.14 148.98
Mar. 8,325.00 6,316.16 166.71 128.61 161.39 155.88
Apr. 7,970.00 6,034.46 176.56 131.56 168.39 164.12
May 10,525.00 7,580.14 183.42 136.99 176.01 168.06
Jun. 14,900.00 10,583.91 196.39 139.17 195.29 171.97
Jul. 13,000.00 9,048.21 220.27 146.93 219.23 186.41
Aug. 11,075.00 7,824.11 240.31 153.51 225.73 197.99
Sep. 10,700.00 7,921.25 261.00 155.92 225.22 204.49
Oct. 7,550.00 6,546.72 256.16 157.35 220.97 208.58
Nov. 7,300.00 5,903.77 255.70 158.11 215.99 210.71
Dec. 8,025.00 7,000.49 263.22 159.03 219.71 212.54
Jan. 1999 8,950.00 7,697.62 281.09 160.62 232.11 214.07
Source: Bank of Indonesia data available online at http://www.bi.go.id/ind/datastatistik/index.htm.TABLE 2
Product Heterogeneity
Product Number of Average Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Aggregate Individual Price of Price Price Price
Products Increase Increases Increase Increase
Foodstuffs 262 112.8% 80.5% -68.3% 612%
Prepared Foods 72 78.4% 41.6% 0.04% 169%
Housing 105 107.7% 76.4% 0.4% 499%
Clothing 94 80.3% 46.4% -0.04% 214%
Health Services 38 85.8% 51.2% 0.0% 263%
Transportation 48 77.3% 84.1% -0.13% 482%
Education & Recreation 43 73.1% 71.5% -9.70% 310%
Notes: Price increases are from January 1997 through October 1998. Average price increases are
computed as the average across all provinces reporting price data for a given good.TABLE 3
HouseholdHeterogeneity
Bottom Middle Top Overall
Decile Decile Decile
per-capita 19241 51959 229097 61596
income (3916 ) ( 2411 ) (74424 ) (218335)
per-capita 21687 46028 136271 49726
expenditure (11342 ) ( 10985 ) (91594 ) (41859 )
Schooling .2526 .5097 .7628 .4734
(.4345 ) ( .4999 ) (.4253 ) (.4993 )
HH Size 4.3958 3.7722 3.6142 3.8911
(1.6940) ( 1.650 ) (1.7225) (1.6911)
food share .83483 .5569 .3233 .5824
of income (1.3818 ( .1375 ) (.1462 ) (.5182 )
rural .9222 .6767 .3042 .6959
(.2678 ) ( .4677 ) (.4601 ) (.4600 )
age of 47.877 43.828 43.147 45.000
HH head (13.714) ( 13.98 ) (13.467) (13.910)
Number 5811 5811 5811 58,100
of HH’s
Notes: Deciles are by per-capita household income. The middle decile includes households with
per-capita incomes between the 50th and 60th percentile. All means are weighted by population sampling
weights. Household size is defined as number of adults plus one half the number of children under 10.
Income and expenditure values are in current (1993) Rupiahs.
Source: 1993 SUSENAS.TABLE 4
Expenditure Shares
Product Bottom Decile Mean Top Decile
Food 68.1% 62.2% 46.9%
Cereals 27.6% 17.8% 6.9%
Rice 24.8% 16.7% 6.4%
Tubers 2.2% 1.1% 0.4%
Cassava 0.7% 0.4% 0.1%
Fish 4.6% 5.4% 4.4%
Meat 0.7% 2.2% 4.0%
Eggs and Milk 1.2% 2.5% 3.5%
Chicken Eggs 0.8% 1.3% 1.3%
Vegetables 7.3% 5.9% 3.7%
Legumes and Soy Products 2.8% 2.6% 1.6%
Fruit 1.9% 2.5% 3.0%
Oil and Animal Fat 3.8% 3.1% 1.8%
Beverages 4.2% 3.7% 2.4%
Sugar 2.7% 2.4% 1.5%
Seasonings 2.6% 2.3% 1.4%
Salt 0.3% 0.2% 0.1%
Ready Made Food and Beverages 4.2% 6.9% 8.7%
Tobacco and Beetle Leaf 4.5% 5.3% 3.9%
Filter clove cigarettes 1.1% 2.6% 2.7%
Non-Food 31.9% 37.8% 53.1%
Housing, Fuel, Lightingand Water 15.8% 17.5% 22.2%
Estimated monthly rent if owned 5.7% 7.5% 11.8%
Electricity 0.7% 1.4% 2.4%
Kerosene 2.7% 2.8% 1.9%
Firewood 5.3% 3.0% 0.5%
Health Care 0.9% 1.2% 1.7%
Education 1.4% 1.9% 3.2%
Gasoline (for transport) 0.0% 0.6% 2.1%
Clothing, Shoes, and Hats 6.4% 6.2% 5.5%
Durable Goods* 1.7% 2.7% 4.9%
Taxes and Insurance 0.6% 1.0% 2.1%
Notes: Source is 1993 SUSENAS. Durable Goods include items such as furniture, household utensils,jewelry, and vehicles. Expenditureshares are givenas a percentage of totalhouseholdexpenditures. Deciles
are ranked by per-capita householdincome.TABLE 5
Cost-of-Living Indices and Income Levels
Income Decile Index 1 Index 2 Index 3
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
1 1.28 1.36 1.25 1.32 1.11 0.73
2 1.26 1.34 1.24 1.30 1.07 0.74
3 1.21 1.32 1.21 1.28 1.06 0.74
4 1.19 1.30 1.19 1.27 1.04 0.75
5 1.14 1.28 1.16 1.25 1.03 0.75
6 1.11 1.26 1.14 1.24 1.01 0.79
7 1.07 1.22 1.12 1.21 0.98 0.81
8 1.03 1.19 1.09 1.19 0.95 0.80
9 0.98 1.14 1.05 1.16 0.91 0.84
10 0.89 1.07 0.99 1.12 0.80 0.83
OVERALL AVERAGE 1.19 1.20 0.84
Notes:
Price index 1 is computed across all disaggregated commodities and does not take into account either
self-producedagricultureor owner-occupiedhousing.Price index2 iscomputed acrossabout20 aggregated
commodities and does not take into account either self-produced agriculture or owner-occupied housing.
Price index 3 is computed across all disaggregated commodities and accounts for both owner-occupied
housingand self-produced goods. Deciles are by per-capita household income.TABLE 6
Regional Variation of Cost-of-LivingIndices
Province Index 1 Index 2 Index 3
Aceh Urban 1.02 1.10 0.98
Rural 1.25 1.25 0.63
North Sumatra Urban 1.13 1.18 1.05
Rural 1.39 1.36 0.87
West Sumatra Urban 1.02 1.12 0.85
Rural 1.26 1.26 0.64
Riau Urban 0.94 1.04 0.90
Rural 1.14 1.14 0.85
Jambi Urban 1.00 0.99 0.95
Rural 1.24 1.16 0.78
Bengkulu Urban 1.18 1.29 1.10
Rural 1.52 1.51 1.09
South Sumatra Urban 1.06 1.16 0.96
Rural 1.31 1.31 0.63
Lampung Urban 0.98 1.11 0.85
Rural 1.17 1.18 0.69
Jakarta Urban 0.93 1.01 0.87
Rural
West Java Urban 1.06 1.12 0.93
Rural 1.21 1.23 0.67
Central Java Urban 1.05 1.06 0.96
Rural 1.18 1.16 0.78
Yogyakarta Urban 1.15 1.14 0.92
Rural 1.36 1.23 0.80
East Java Urban 1.13 1.17 0.97
Rural 1.33 1.29 0.98
Bali Urban 1.08 1.10 0.97
Rural 1.29 1.27 0.95
NTB Urban 1.25 1.22 1.14
Rural 1.50 1.41 1.01
Notes: Table is continuedon the next page.TABLE 6 (continued)
Regional Variation of Cost-of-LivingIndices
Province Index 1 Index 2 Index 3
NTT Urban 0.84 0.85 0.74
Rural 0.98 1.02 0.09
East Timor Urban 0.92 1.06 0.83
Rural 1.02 1.07 0.39
West Kalimantan Urban 1.10 1.26 0.98
Rural 1.49 1.53 0.76
Central Kalimantan Urban 1.09 1.14 1.03
Rural 1.43 1.37 0.71
South Kalimantan Urban 1.13 1.12 1.07
Rural 1.45 1.28 0.85
East Kalimantan Urban 0.90 1.02 0.83
Rural 1.14 1.18 0.80
North Sulawesi Urban 1.05 1.04 0.98
Rural 1.23 1.14 0.88
Central Sulawesi Urban 1.21 1.23 1.10
Rural 1.52 1.40 0.70
South Sulawesi Urban 0.93 1.00 0.84
Rural 1.09 1.13 0.42
Southeast Sulawesi Urban 1.38 1.37 1.31
Rural 1.61 1.54 0.98
Maluku Urban 0.95 1.06 0.90
Rural 1.19 1.22 0.61
Irian Jaya Urban 0.75 0.81 0.67
Rural 0.91 0.89 0.38
Notes:
Price index 1 is computed across all disaggregated commodities and does not take into account either
self-producedagricultureor owner-occupiedhousing.Price index2 iscomputed acrossabout20 aggregated
commodities and does not take into account either self-produced agriculture or owner-occupied housing.
Price index 3 is computed across all disaggregated commodities and accounts for both owner-occupied
housingand self-produced goods.TABLE 7
Cost-of-Living Regressions
Dependant Variable: Index 1 (Index without Housingor Self-Production)
Ind. Var. OLS Fixed OLS Fixed OLS Fixed
Effects Effects Effects
ln(Income) -.100 -.098 -.151 -.154 -.146 -.150
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Rural .163 .158 .141 .138 .138 .135
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.001)
ln(Size) .143 .147 .142 .146
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.001)
Degree -.023 -.019
(.001) (.001)
Dependant Variable: Index 3 (Index with Housingand Self-Production)
ln(Income) -.046 -.028 -.046 -.029 -.049 -.031
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Rural -.214 -.201 -.214 -.201 -.212 -.199
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
ln(Size) -.000 .001 .000 .001
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Degree .014 .012
(.004) (.004)
Notes: Regressions had approximately 58,000 observations.